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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Zane Fields (hereinafter "Fields") was convicted of murdering Mary Catherine Vanderford 
by stabbing her during a robbery at the Wishing Well gift store on Fairview Avenue in Boise in 
1988. He was sentenced to death. State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 908 P.2d 1211 (1995). 
This case is an appeal from the denial of a successive post-conviction relief petition. 
Fields challenged his conviction and death sentence based on newly discovered evidence of 
recanted testimony and police misconduct. His successive petition was summarily dismissed by 
the district court. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
Fields filed this Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on July 28, 2011 (hereinafter 
"Petition"). R. 4. This was within 42 days of a State's witness orally recanting his pre-trial 
testimony. R. 63. 
The proceedings below focused upon whether summary dismissal was appropriate. No 
discovery or evidentiary hearing occurred. 
On September 28, 2011, the State filed a Response to the July 28, 2011, Successive 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief and State's Motion to Dismiss. R. 128. The State raised 
three grounds for dismissal: 1) the supporting declaration under penalty of perjury was an 
unsworn statement and invalid affidavit; 2) evidence relied upon by Fields had been previously 
raised and considered and therefore was resjudicata and unworthy of further consideration; and 3) 
the Petition was untimely because the information should have been discovered much sooner. R. 
129-33. The State filed affidavits in support of its motion to dismiss. R. 135-36, 143-57. 
Fields responded with legal argument and additional supporting affidavits on December 21, 2011. 
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R. 164-187. The State replied on January 20, 2012, R. 230, and included an additional affidavit. 
R. 237. Countering the additional affidavit and argument, Fields filed an additional affidavit 
from the former State witness in support of the Petition and in opposition to all of the State's 
moving papers. R. 261-65. The district court dismissed the Petition on November 27, 2012. R. 
267. 
Fields filed his timely Notice of Appeal on December 18, 2012. R. 280. After settlement 
of the record, Fields agreed to expedite briefing and hereby files this Opening Brief pursuant to the 
established briefing schedule. See Response to Motion to Expedite Appeal filed on February 14, 
2013 and Order Granting Motion to Expedite Appeal filed on February 22, 2013. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
After on-going efforts to undermine the inmate testimony reporting Fields confessed to 
killing Mrs. Vanderford, Fields filed this successive Petition upon uncovering contrary evidence. 
Through an investigator, federal habeas counsel tracked down Harold Gilcrist, traveled to him and 
talked with Gilcrist about his testimony. On June 17, 2011, Gilcrist verbally recanted and on July 
8, signed a declaration under penalty of perjury. R. 63. Gilcrist affirmed that Fields never 
confessed and testimony about Fields confessing was a lie. R. 70. Gilcrist stated he used 
information from the police investigation to fabricate the confession. The information about the 
crime came from Detective Dave Smith. Id. The most critical information was Detective 
Smith's statement to Gilcrist that Fields "killed an old lady for fifty bucks." Id. Gilcrist stated 
that he shared the crime information with inmates, Joe Heistand and Scott Bianchi, who testified at 
trial against Fields. R. 70-71. 
On July 28, 2011, Fields filed the underlying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Three 
claims were raised: innocence based on Gilcrist's recantation of his testimony reporting a 
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confession by Fields; prosecutorial misconduct based upon Detective Smith's manipulation of 
witnesses; and violations of right to counsel, due process and fair trial rights under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. R. 4-15. 
The State moved to summarily dismiss the Petition under Idaho Code§ 19-2719. R. 131, 
134. The State challenged Gilcrist' s declaration made under penalty of perjury as an inadmissible 
unswom statement and invalid affidavit. R. 129. The State also alleged that much of the 
evidence relied upon by Fields had been previously raised and considered and therefore was res 
judicata and unworthy of further consideration. R. 129-30. Although Fields had filed his 
Petition within 42 days of discovering Gilcrist's recantation, the State also alleged that the Petition 
was untimely because the information should have been discovered much sooner, perhaps as early 
as 1991 when the initial post-conviction petition was filed. R. 131. The State filed affidavits 
rebutting some of the material facts in the Petition. R. 148-51, 135-36, 154-56. 
Fields responded and filed additional sworn affidavits. He obtained and filed a sworn, 
notarized affidavit from Gilcrist re-stating verbatim the facts asserted in the original declaration 
made under penalty of perjury. R. 176. Fields also filed an affidavit from federal habeas 
attorney Bruce Livingston, detailing more extensively the consistent and periodic efforts to find 
Gilcrist since 2001. Livingston reviewed prior counsel's file, noted evidence of efforts in 1996 to 
investigate the various inmate informant witnesses, including Gilcrist, but found no interview 
notes for Gilcrist. R. 186. Finally, Fields filed affidavits disputing the State's attempt to rebut 
some of the material facts in the Petition, plainly making Detective Smith's credibility a disputed 
question of fact. R. 179-84. 
The State replied and asserted that Fields's additional affidavits did not establish that the 
successive Petition was timely filed. R. 231-32. Arguing that Fields should have discovered the 
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Gilcrist recantation sooner than 2011, R. 232-36, the State filed an additional affidavit and 
supporting materials. R. 237-56. 
Responding to the State's additional argument, Fields filed a separate, additional affidavit 
from Gilcrist. Gilcrist admitted he had been unwilling to tell anybody "what really happened" 
regarding his testimony against Fields. R. 264. Gilcrist swore that prior to a 2009 medical crisis 
and near death experience, he would not have told the truth about how he fabricated the 
confession. Id. 
The district court determined that the recantation could not have been known within 42 
days of the March 1991 judgment. R. 272-73. The court then framed the issue as to when the 
recantation reasonably could have been known and whether the Petition was brought within a 
reasonable time thereafter. R. 273. 
The court found the Petition did not allege facts establishing when the claims reasonably 
should have been known. R. 274. The court first excluded the Gilcrist declaration attached to 
the Petition because it was not made under "oath or affirmation." R. 275. The court then 
excluded the subsequently filed affidavit, re-stating Gilcrist's declaration verbatim, because it was 
not submitted with the Petition. R. 275-76. Likewise, the court excluded all subsequent 
affidavits submitted in support of the Petition. R. 274. The court concluded that the heightened 
pleading requirements ofldaho Code§ 19-2719(5) had not been met, R. 274, and that the Petition 
did not make a required showing under§ 19-2719(5) for excepted issues supported by material 
facts stated under oath or affirmation. R. 274-75. 
Lastly, the court found that Gilcrist's recantation was "merely impeaching" because 
Gilcrist did not testify at trial and the information only served to impeach the testimony of 
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Detective Smith and two inmate witnesses. R. 276. The court also dismissed the Petition under 
§ 19-2719(5)(b). R. 276-277. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The district court improperly applied Idaho Code§ 19-2719(5) and incorrectly dismissed 
this Petition. The district court: 
1. Improperly applied§ 19-2719(5) to find the Petition did not meet the exception for 
successive petitions, when it found the Petition did not plead facts asserting the new information in 
Gilcrist's declaration could not reasonably have been known until the June 2011 discovery. 
2. Improperly applied§ 19-2719(5) by refusing to consider any subsequent evidence 
submitted in opposition to the State's summary dismissal motion, reply and supporting affidavits 
to establish the exception for successive petitions. 
3. Improperly applied § 19-2719( 5) by refusing to consider material facts stated under 
affirmation and filed with the Petition to establish the exception for successive petitions. 
4. Improperly applied§ 19-2719(5)(b) by finding the newly discovered evidence is 
merely impeaching. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard for Review 
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and are governed by the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40, 232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010); Rhoades v. State, 
135 Idaho 299, 300, 17 P.3d 243, 244 (2000). Post-conviction procedures are generally governed 
by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act (UPCPA), Idaho Code§§ 19-4901 et seq. 
Stuart, 149 Idaho at 40, 232 P.3d at 818. However, in a capital case, Idaho Code§ 19-2719 
prescribes specific procedures applicable to post-conviction proceedings. Id. 
Applicable here is the requirement that claims which were "known or reasonably should 
have been known" at the imposition of the judgment and death sentence are waived if not raised 
within 42 days of the imposition of sentence. Idaho Code § 19-2719(5). See Pizzuto v. State, 
149 Idaho 155, 160, 233 P.3d 86, 91 (2010) (hereinafter "Pizzuto (2010) "). An exception to this 
waiver is made if"the issues raised were not known or could not reasonably have been known 
within the forty-two day time frame." Id. (quoting McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701, 992 P.2d at 150). 
A petitioner bringing a successive petition has a heightened burden of making a prima facie 
showing that the issues raised fall within the narrow exception provided by§ 19-2719(5). Pizzuto 
(2010), 149 Idaho at 160, 233 P.3d at 91; Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 227, 912 P.2d 110, 114 
( 1996). The excepted claims must be raised within 42 days after the petitioner knew or should 
have known of the claim. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008) 
(hereinafter "Pizzuto (2008) "). 
Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is the procedural equivalent of 
summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Rhoades, 135 Idaho at 300, 17 P.3d 
at 244; McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999). To withstand summary 
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dismissal, a petitioner '"must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element 
of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof."' Pizzuto (2008), 146 Idaho at 
728, 202 P.2d at 650 (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (Idaho 2003)). 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, 
the Court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 
561, 199P.3d 123, 136(2008). See Rhoades, 135Idahoat300, l7P.3dat244(same);McKinney, 
133 Idaho at 700, 992 P.2d at 149 (same). 
When this Court reviews a motion to dismiss based upon§ 19-2719, the standard of review 
is to determine if the statutory exception to the waiver of claims has been met. Stuart, 149 Idaho 
at 40, 232 P .3d at 818. The court views the facts "in a light most favorable to the petitioner." 
Pizzuto (2010), 149 Idaho at 160, 233 P.3d at 91 (citing Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 
102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004)). A "trial court's determination that no material issue of fact exists is 
the same type of determination as in a summary judgment proceeding." Id. Whether a 
successive petition for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code§ 
19-2719 is a question oflaw and is reviewed de nova. Pizzuto (2010), 149 Idaho at 159-60, 233 
P.3d at 90-91. 
B. The New Claims Meet the Statutory Requirements for the Exception to the Waiver 
Rule 
1. The Petition Was Timely Filed 
The Petition was timely and meets the exception to the waiver rule. Idaho Code § 
19-2719(5). A petition for successive relief may be filed for claims that were not known or 
reasonably could not have been known within the initial 42 days after judgment. Idaho Code§ 
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19-2719(5). The district court found that the facts of the recantation could not reasonably have 
been known within the initial 42 day statutory time period. R. 273. "Mr. Gilcrist had not yet 
changed his story within forty-two days of the filing of the judgment, and the Court finds that the 
facts regarding Mr. Gilcrist's new story, alleged in the July 28, 2011 successive Petition, could not 
reasonably have been known within that time period." R. 273. 
Fields filed the Petition within 42 days of knowing the facts that formed the basis for his 
new claims. R. 4. On June 17, 2011, Gilcrist verbally recanted his prior testimony and on July 8, 
signed a declaration under penalty of perjury. R. 63. On July 28, 2011, less than 42 days after 
learning of Gilcrist' s recantation, Fields filed a verified Petition supported by affidavits and other 
admissible evidence. R. 4. This was within a reasonable time of discovering the claim. See 
Pizzuto (2008), 146 Idaho at 727, 202 P.3d at 649. 
The district court rejected the time when Gilcrist made the disclosure as the reasonable 
time in which the claim should have been known. The court ignored this timely filing and instead 
focused upon "when the new facts alleged reasonably should have been known .... " R. 273. 
This was an incorrect application of the statute and the district court should be reversed. 
2. The Petitioner Properly Pied Facts Meeting the Heightened Pleading Burden 
to Establish Waiver Exception 
The district court analyzed the timeliness of the Petition based upon when the facts 
disclosed by Gilcrist (the "Recantation") reasonably should have been known. R. 273-7 4. The 
district court held that Fields did not meet the heightened pleading requirement of§ 19-2719. The 
district court found that Fields had not alleged facts within the Petition showing when his claim 
reasonably should have been known. R. 274. The district court's conclusion was erroneous. 
8 
Fields alleged facts in his Petition and attached affidavits showing that he had been 
attempting to find Gilcrist, repeatedly, for years without success. R. 7,11, 8 ,13, 61-64. 
Gilcrist affirmed that he had never previously disclosed the information to anyone representing 
Fields. R. 71 ~11. The State asserted that Fields had not established why the claim was not 
discovered sooner. R. 130-33. In response, Fields provided additional sworn testimony 
addressing the State's objections. R. 176-87; R. 264. Fields also argued that "Gilcrist indicated 
his continuing cooperation with the State in testimony at post-trial hearings, giving no indication 
that a recantation was likely." R. 173. 
The district court ruled that Fields had not shown that the Gilcrist Recantation could not 
reasonably have been known sooner than when Fields ultimately discovered it. The Petition was 
dismissed because it was silent as to when Gilcrist decided to change his story. R. 273 & n.1. 
The district court reached this conclusion because it refused to consider the declaration attached to 
the Petition and any affidavit not attached to the Petition. 
Under §19-2719, the issue is not when Gilcrist decided to change his story, but when the 
Recantation reasonably should have known. See Pacheco v. Artuz, 193 F.Supp.2d 756, 761 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (recantation is an unique form of evidence and no amount of due diligence can 
compel a witness to admit to lying). All of the filed affidavits established the primafacie case 
that Fields could not reasonably have known of Gilcrist' s Recantation until Gilcrist was tracked 
down and interviewed in June, 2011. R. 176-87, 264. The district court's rejection of this as the 
reasonable time in which to know of the claim was erroneous and must be reversed. 
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3. Subsequent Evidence Submitted to Cure Pleading Defects Must Be 
Considered 
The district court ruled that defects in the Petition's heightened pleading requirements may 
not be cured with additional supporting affidavits. R. 275. The State did not object to Petitioner 
filing subsequent affidavits to cure alleged defects in the Petition's factual allegations. R. 128-34, 
230-36. Both parties submitted affidavits and documents for the court's consideration on 
multiple occasions. R. 18-120, 135-57, 176-87, 237-56, 264. The district court sua sponte 
disregarded the subsequent supporting affidavits and gave no notice to Fields about this issue. R. 
274. 
Excluding subsequent affidavits is an improper application of§ 19-2719(5) and this Court's 
jurisprudence on successive capital petitions. A petitioner in a successive capital post-conviction 
proceeding may defend against attacks on the timeliness of a petition by submitting contravening 
affidavits. Here, the supporting affidavits established the prima facie pleading requirements, 
created genuine issues of material facts, and made summary dismissal inappropriate. 
This Court's jurisprudence approving supplementary affidavit evidence in cases subject to 
the heightened pleading requirements of§ 19-2719 reaches back at least to McKinney. In 
response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, McKinney filed a reply and "several 
affidavits in support" of his initial petition. McKinney, 133 Idaho at 698, 992 P.2d at 147. 
Subsequently, the district court permitted limited discovery, and based on information gained in 
discovery, McKinney sought to amend his petition. Id. Ultimately, the court dismissed most of 
the claims under Idaho Code§ 19-2719, and eventually dismissed the remaining "failure to 
disclose exculpatory evidence" claim as a claim that should have been known in the first 
post-conviction proceeding. 
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In Pizzuto (2010), the petitioner filed a supplemental affidavit supporting his prima facie 
case. Pizzuto (2010), 149 Idaho at 161-62, 233 P.3d at 92-93. The petition was filed on 
November 25, 2005, and an amended petition was filed on May 4, 2006. Id. at 158, 233 P.3d at 
89. A supplemental affidavit, signed after the amended petition, attempted to explain why an 
earlier affidavit had not revealed relevant timeliness disclosures. Id. at 161, 233 P .3d at 92. This 
Court considered and relied upon the later-filed affidavit. Id. at 162, 233 P.3d at 93. 
In another successive post-conviction case subject to Idaho Code § 19-2719, this Court 
again considered subsequently filed affidavits. In that case, the heightened prima facie pleading 
requirement at issue was not timeliness, but the elements of the claim itself. This Court 
acknowledged that to withstand summary dismissal, the petitioner had to present evidence 
establishing aprimafacie case as to each element of the claim. Pizzuto (2008), 146 Idaho at 728, 
202 P.3d at 650. The petition was filed on June 29, 2003, with a number of attached affidavits. 
Id. at 727, 202 P.3d at 649. In analyzing the case, this Court considered a subsequently filed 
affidavit in determining whether the petitioner met the statutory pleading requirements of 
establishing a prima facie case. Id. at 730, 202 P .3d at 652. 
In Fields II, this Court considered and relied upon a subsequent affidavit attaching new 
evidence filed in support of a successor petition. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 290-91, 17 P.3d 
230, 234-35 (2000) (Fields II). The affidavit asserted that a trial witness recanted testimony and 
that the State suppressed its deals with testifying inmates in violation of Brady v. Maryland. 
Fields II, 135 Idaho at 290, 17 P.3d at 234. This Court declined to consider the new substantive 
Brady recantation claim raised in the affidavit, because Fields failed to amend his petition to 
include those claims. This Court considered the new evidence with regard to the substantive 
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claim of the suppressed "inmate deal" and denied relief on the merits. Id. at 290-91, 17 P.3d at 
234-35. 
This Court has held that the§ 19-2719 heightened pleading burden may be satisfied by the 
allegations in the petition and documents and affidavits filed in support of the petition and, in 
general language, does not expressly limit the supporting materials to those physically attached to 
the petition. See, e.g., Rhoades, 135 Idaho at 300, 17 P.3d at 244 (2000) ("On review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court must 
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and 
admissions together with any affidavits on file.") (emphasis added). The district court failed to 
apply this Court's jurisprudence when determining whether to consider subsequently filed 
affidavits. 
The district court's discussion of Stuart, 149 Idaho at 42, 232 P.3d at 820, regarding a 
petition silent as to when a petitioner should have known of a successive claim, missed the point 
relevant to this case. R. 273. Stuart's application to this case is not whether the record was silent 
as to the primafacie showing of timeliness. Stuart, 149 Idaho at 42, 232 P.3d at 820. The 
relevant point from Stuart is its acknowledgment that a petitioner may make his prima facie 
showing through the petition itself "or otherwise attempting to demonstrate by way of supporting 
affidavit(s) that his claims were not known to him nor could they reasonably have been known." 
Stuart, 149 Idaho at 41, 232 P.3d at 819. 
In the current case, Fields alleged a prima facie claim that he could not have reasonably 
known about Gilcrist's changed story until 2011 based upon the Petition, attached affidavits and 
supporting documents, and subsequently filed affidavits. Initially, Fields noted that his lawyers 
and investigators had been attempting to find and contact inmate witnesses, including Gilcrist, 
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"repeatedly over the intervening years since Fields was convicted." R. 7, 61-64. In a subsequent 
affidavit, Fields outlined prior counsel's efforts. This included that prior counsel identified 
Gilcrist as a target of investigation. No interview notes for Gilcrist were found in prior counsel's 
files. R. 186. Fields presented a reasonable inference that Gilcrist could not be found by prior 
counsel. R. 186. After repeated unsuccessful attempts by federal counsel to find Gilcrist, Fields 
was finally successful in the summer of201 l. R. 4, 7-8, 61-64, 70-71, 186-87. Additionally, 
Fields filed a subsequent affidavit by Gilcrist. In that affidavit, Gilcrist signed under oath to the 
same factual allegations in the initial declaration under penalty of perjury. R. 70, 176. Nothing 
changed in substance, and the allegations in both instances were reliable evidence. 
Fields filed another, second affidavit from Gilcrist which also should have been 
considered. This affidavit completed the primafacie case regarding when the information should 
have been discovered. Fields' s pleadings stand in direct contrast to those found lacking in Pizzuto 
(2010). In Pizzuto (2010), concluding that aprimafacie showing had not been made regarding 
newly found information from a witness, this Court stated: "[the witness] never stated he had 
previously been asked about the plea agreement and either lied or declined to answer." Pizzuto 
(2010), 149 Idaho at 162, 233 P.3d at 93. Gilcrist expressly stated that prior to his medical crisis 
in 2009, he "would not have told the truth about what happened," R. 264, and that he "never 
previously disclosed this information to anyone representing Zane Fields." R. 71, 177. In his 
Petition and supporting affidavits, Fields established not only that Gilcrist had not been asked 
about the new information, but that the information would not have been forthcoming. Fields 
affirmatively demonstrated the new information could not have been discovered from Gilcrist 
until after his 2009 medical crisis. 
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Gilcrist's second affidavit stating that he would not have disclosed the information until his 
near-death experience in 2009, R. 264, together with affidavits explaining Fields's repeated efforts 
to find Gilcrist (and evidence of the fabricated confession and police misconduct from other 
sources) long before 2009 through 2011, established a prima facie case that Fields reasonably 
could not have known of the Gilcrist Recantation until the summer of201 l. Fields diligently and 
timely brought forward his claims regarding the Gilcrist Recantation. 
The Petition included admissible evidence establishing that the claim reasonably could not 
have been known until counsel found and obtained the Gilcrist Recantation. Some of this 
evidence was submitted with the Petition and additional evidence was submitted in response to the 
State's arguments. Affidavits are routinely submitted in opposition to summary judgment in civil 
cases generally, and in post-conviction proceedings in an attempt to cure defects in the petition in 
response to a motion for summary dismissal or a court's notice of intent to dismiss. See, e.g., 
Pizzuto (2010), 149 Idaho at 161-62, 233 P.3d at 92-93; Fields II, 135 Idaho at 288, 290-91, 17 
P.3d at 232, 234-35; McKinney, 133 Idaho at 698-700, 992 P.2d at 147-49. The district court's 
narrow construction and application of§ 19-2719 was improper and should be reversed. 
4. Sworn, Admissible, Material Evidence Supported The Petition 
The district court stated that the Petition was "not supported by material facts stated under 
oath or affirmation, as Mr. Gilcrist's Declaration was unsworn and unverified." R. 275. The 
primafacie case was supported by a declaration under penalty of perjury, an affirmation, if not a 
sworn statement under oath. R. 70. Cf Idaho Code§ 19-2719 (requiring statement of material 
facts under "oath or affirmation") (emphasis added). See Black's Law Dictionary 55 (5th ed. 
1979) (An affirmation is a "solemn and formal declaration or asseveration that an affidavit is true, 
that the witness will tell the truth, etc; this being substituted for an oath in certain cases.") 
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(emphasis added). "The basic purpose behind an oath is to affirm the import and necessity of 
telling the truth." State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 641, 67 P.3d 831, 836 (2003). The initial 
declaration satisfied the basic purpose of an oath and constituted an affirmation under§ 19-2719. 
5. The Gilcrist Affidavit is Substantive Evidence 
The district court also dismissed the Petition under Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(b ), finding 
Gilcrist's story was "merely impeaching." R. 276. The district court noted that Gilcrist did not 
testify at trial and Gilcrist's allegations served only to impeach Detective Smith and other inmates 
who testified at trial. The nature of the Recantation and misconduct information is twofold: it 
was impeaching with regard to Detective Smith and the other testifying inmate snitches, but it was 
also substantive evidence of Smith's misconduct. Gilcrist's affidavit provides substantive 
evidence of police misconduct, a rogue detective willing to cheat justice to obtain a conviction, and 
feeding information to witnesses to procure a conviction of an innocent man with false testimony. 
Detective Smith suppressed this information, and the State did not disclose it. As set forth in the 
Petition, that conduct violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Jllinois, 360 
U.S. 264 (1959); and Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). While including an impeaching 
component, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985), the Gilcrist Recantation also 
substantively supported the claims alleged in the Petition. The use of Gilcrist as a state agent, 
funneling false information to the other inmates, likewise violated Fields's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court erred in dismissing the Petition on 
the ground that it was merely impeaching. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred by concluding the Petition was facially inadequate, refusing to 
consider facts stated under affirmation, and refusing to consider the subsequent affidavits when 
determining the timeliness of the Petition. The district court also erred by dismissing the 
substantive nature of the new evidence and dismissing the Petition's claims as impeaching. 
The district court's order dismissing the successive Petition must be reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Court's capital successive petition 
jurisprudence. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of April, 2013. 
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